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1. INTRODUCTION
The debate on the relationship between the financial and the non-finan-
cial sectors of the economy is an old one. Schumpeter (1911) argued that an 
efficient and effective financial system has a positive impact on economic 
growth. Keynes (1930) argued in favour of the importance of the banking 
sector for economic growth. He suggested that bank credit “is the pavement 
along which production travels, and the bankers if they knew their duty, 
would provide the transport facilities to just the extent that is required 
in order that the productive powers of the community can be employed 
at their full capacity” (1930, II, p. 220). Keynes (1936) subsequently argued 
in favour of government control over investment. Robinson claimed that 
“where enterprise leads, finance follows” (1952, p. 86), so that financial 
development follows growth.
Recently this debate has experienced renewed interest after the financial 
crisis, which revealed the extraordinary growth of the financial sector 
INDUSTRIAL CHANGE, FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND COHERENT INDUSTRIAL POLICY
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 154  ➻  2 E TR IMESTRE 2016208
over the last 30 years, and the increasing gap between the financial and 
the real sectors of the economy, a phenomenon which has been called 
“financialization” (Epstein, 2001; Krippner, 2004; Crotty, 2005).
The period of the extraordinary growth of the financial sector is also a 
period of important changes in the “real” or industrial sector. Bianchi 
and Labory (2006, 2010, 2013) showed that this period is characterised by 
increasing pressure for structural change due to the necessity for firms 
to adapt to changing competitive conditions. The competitive context has 
indeed started to dramatically alter, starting from the crisis of the mass 
production system and of the large firm, and the diffusion of new produc-
tion organisational models (for instance automation, Japanese system, as 
well as industrial districts). From the 1990s onwards industries from the 
developed countries have been increasingly challenged by new players, 
especially from emerging countries. Globalisation has increased, in the 
sense of intensifying trade and FDI worldwide, due to opportunities in 
new and growing markets and differentials in input costs, eased by new 
technology such as ICTs.
Industrial policies, in the sense of sets of measures aimed at favour-
ing structural changes in productive sectors, have been implemented 
throughout the entire period starting after World War II and up to today, 
even in the 1990s when even the word should not be mentioned (Bianchi 
and Labory, 2006). Many scholars have analysed these policies, particu-
larly in Europe (Cohen, 2007; Federico and Foreman-Peck, 1999; Bailey 
and Driffield, 2007), and in Asia (Chang, 2006; Lall, 2006). However, 
the type of adopted measures have changed, so that three phases of 
the implementation of industrial policy in the period can be identified 
(Bianchi and Labory, 2006, 2011; Labory, 2006). The first phase is that of 
interventionist and selective industrial policies, characterised by direct 
intervention of the government in markets, the government often being 
producer, via state-ownership. Such policies tended to favour “national 
champions” or consisted in “picking the winner”. In Europe, this was 
also accompanied by a lax implementation of competition policy and reg-
ulation of the “command-and-control” type.1 This type of policy started 
1 Command-and-control is defined in contrast to incentive-based regulation: the for-
mer imposes the behaviour on agents (essentially through standards) while the 
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to show inefficiencies in the 1970s, where state-owned firms tended to 
have low productivity or made wrong strategic choices due to the influ-
ence of other interests than the purely profit-maximising interests of the 
firm (particularly government interests such as preserving employment 
in recessions).
The second period is that of the 1980s and 1990s essentially, and can be 
called the liberal years. Industrial policies of the past were abandoned 
because of their inefficiencies. However, policies promoting structural 
changes were still implemented, under different names: competitiveness 
or enterprise policies. Competition policy was implemented more strin-
gently, regulation became incentive-based, and measures to favour struc-
tural changes were preferably horizontal: implemented across all sectors 
of the economy rather than sector or firm-specific. Preferred measures 
include policies for SMEs, favouring their networking and supporting 
entrepreneurship by simplifying firm creation procedures, providing 
training, better access to finance; innovation policies with R&D collab-
orative programmes, particularly between university and industry, as 
well as subsidies for research projects on important – generic – technol-
ogies. The aim of industrial policy in that period was to provide the con-
ditions for the competitiveness of industry. In Europe, these objectives 
were included in the Maastricht Treaty after the Bangemann Report, 
which proposes this new industrial policy, calling it competitiveness 
policy, where the state is a pioneer and catalyst of changes (Bangemann, 
1990).
The focus on providing the conditions for the competitiveness of firms 
and the development of sectors continues in the third period of industrial 
policy. This essentially starts at the turn of the new century, when indus-
trial firms, increasingly call for industrial policy. In Europe this culmi-
nates in the declaration of two heads of states, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard 
Schroeder, in 2003, proposing industrial policy to end de-industrialisation 
and respond to competitiveness challenges of the new century.
latter induces agents to adopt the right behaviour, such as a tax on pollution which 
induces agents to change behaviour and adopt pollution-abating strategies because it 
becomes utility-maximising.
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Like in the liberal years, competition policy is still stringently applied, 
regulation is rather incentive-based, measures and actions are primarily 
horizontal and aim at providing the conditions for competitiveness and 
development; however, vertical measures in the sense of measures specific 
to sectors are also envisaged if necessary to reach the objectives (European 
Commission, 2003, 2006, 2010).
Regarding the financial sector, the liberal years are also years of impor-
tant financial deregulation. A strong wave of hostile takeovers took place 
in the 1980s, followed by important changes in corporate governance in 
the 1990s: institutional shareholders strengthened. In Europe, various 
steps were taken in the 1990s to progressively integrate the European 
financial market in view of the adoption of the euro in the European 
Monetary Union. These years were also characterised by an increasing 
transfer of earnings from non-financial corporations to financial mar-
kets in the forms of interest and dividend payments and stock buy-
backs. Top managers increasingly focused on the short-term value of the 
firms’ shares rather than long-term objectives of investment and growth, 
thereby  diffusing “short-termism” among management of non-financial 
corpo rations.
The financial sector substantially developed but this was generally seen as 
part of the tertiarisation of the economy, namely the growing importance 
of the service sector relative to the primary (agriculture) and secondary 
(industry) sectors. Thus the financial sector developed a lot, encouraged 
by governments, which saw this as a normal tertiarisation of the econ-
omy that would create jobs in the financial sector for those who lost jobs 
in declining industries.
Until the financial crisis exploded and revealed the exaggerated growth of 
the financial sector relative to the real sector, and the financialization of 
firms’ strategies in both the financial (banks) and non-financial sectors.
In fact, the financial sector grew so big and made so high profits that 
the question was raised as to whether it impeded non-financial structural 
change as a result, by drawing away not only money, but also human cap-
ital from the real sector, since many engineers preferred working in the 
financial sector to get higher wages.
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The aim of this paper is to discuss the effects of financialisation on the 
real sector. The evidence on financial sector development and financial-
isation is highlighted on the basis of a literature review in the second 
section. The third section examines the effects of financialisation and 
excessive financial sector growth on the real sector. The fourth section 
argues that the return of industrial policy in the new century has been 
characterised by measures addressing the negative effects of financial-
isation on firms. The new industrial policy of the 21st century does not 
represent a return to selective and interventionist policies of the 1960s 
and 1970s but consists in broad policy sets aiming at favouring structural 
changes and industrial development. The conclusions are that these 
broad sets should include the financial sector to ensure that finance 
is dedicated to financing the real economy rather than to speculative 
activities.
2. EVIDENCE ON THE EXAGGERATED GROWTH 
OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
The financial system has a crucial role in stimulating economic growth 
and development. There is consensus in the literature on the fact thet the 
financial system contributes to economic efficiency, a better allocation 
of productive capital, and increase long-term growth (Levine, 2005, for a 
review).
However, more dynamic and larger financial industries are also associ-
ated with more frequent financial shocks and higher risk. The damages of 
the 2008 financial crisis illustrate this point.
The financial sector has grown enormously in the last decades. Data 
abound to support this stylised fact. In the US, the number of employ-
ees in the financial sector has more than doubled between 1970 and 2006 
(Figure 1). The banking sector’s assets in the UK was 50% of GDP in the 
1970s, and 300% in 2000, 550% in 2007. The reasons for this trend include 
the fact that the UK is an important financial centre, while both global 
savings and profits dramatically rose in the period.
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Figure 1. Employees in the US financial sector, thousands
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (data downloaded www.bls.gov).
More generally, data on market capitalisation and the total value o stock 
trades give an indication of the huge growth of the financial sector 
(Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 2. Market Capitalisation of listed domestic companies 
(USD trillions)
Source: World Bank at beta.data.worldbank.org.
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Figure 3. Stocks traded (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank at beta.data.worldbank.org.
The role of the financial sector is to identify productive opportunities and 
drive resources to these opportunities so that they can grow. During the 
last decades the US financial market has helped the development of new 
sectors with the relatively easy availability of venture capital or other cap-
ital for business start-ups. Florida and Kenney (1988) argued in favour of 
the positive role of venture capitalists in innovation in the USA. Kortum 
and Lerner (2000) showed that venture capital has accounted for about 
8% of patented innovations in the period 1965 to 1992. Venture capital has 
increased substantially in the USA after a 1979 law. In Europe, the develop-
ment of venture capital has been more recent and often sponsored by gov-
ernments. Da Rin and Penas (2007) showed that venture capital has had 
a positive effect on innovation in Dutch firms in the late-1990s and early 
years 2000, by inducing them to strengthen both their absorptive capacity 
and their in-house R&D efforts. In contrast, it appears that government-
sponsored venture capital has positive effects on business as long as the 
provided funds remain relatively low, while the effects become negative as 
the amount of government-sponsored venture funds rise (non-monotonic 
relationship highlighted by Brander et al., 2010, looking at effects on the 
likelihood of exit of funded firms).
However, too big financial markets can produce bubbles, excessive risk-
taking and over-leveraging.
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The issue of the optimal size of the financial sector is not resolved. 
Research shows that there are non-linearities in the relation between 
the size of the financial markets and economic growth. The relation-
ship is positive up to some level, but for high levels of the size of finan-
cial markets the relationship starts to weaken (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 
2012, 2015; Rioja-Valev, 2004). “That is, at low levels, a larger financial 
system goes hand in hand with higher productivity growth. But there 
comes a point – one that many advanced economies passed long ago – 
where more banking and more credit are associated with lower growth” 
(Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012, p. 1). In addition, these authors find that 
faster growth in finance has a negative impact on aggregate productiv-
ity, basing their analysis on a sample of 50 advanced and emerging econo-
mies over the period 1980 to 2009 and using different measures of finan-
cial sector growth.
There is also evidence that the growth of the financial sector has largely 
been self-referential, as the rise in claims and obligations has mainly 
arisen among financial firms. For instance Bartiloro and Di Iasio (2012) 
argue that non-financial corporations have only partially taken advan-
tage of the large increase in the financial sector in the last 15 years. They 
analyse the way in which differences in financial systems are reflected 
in firms’ capital structure. Comparing France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
UK and the US, they show that all countries saw their stock exchanges 
substantially increase, except for Germany and Italy which financial sys-
tems largely remain bank-based. However, this rise in the financial sec-
tor is essentially due to a growth in the financial intermediaries (namely 
banks, central bank and market mutual funds), which asset holdings have 
substantially increased, although to a lesser extent in the US. The lia-
bility structure of financial intermediaries has also changed in impor-
tant ways. Retail deposits of households have been replaced by shares and 
other equity. The relevance of funding by means of short-term loans has 
thus substantially increased, implying a higher interconnection of the 
financial system. The financial systems of these different countries there-
fore appear to have become more vulnerable because more intertwined 
and more reliant on short-term instruments. Non-financial firms do not 
seem to have drawn any substantial benefits from these changes since the 
rise in inter-bank deposits and securities comes at the expense of long-
term loans to firms.
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The growing importance of the financial sector is also discussed in the 
“financialization” debate. The concept of financialization of firms or of 
the economy has indeed appeared in the economic and political debates 
with different but related meanings. First, the concept of financialization 
of the economy refers to the large increase in the absolute and relative 
value of financial transactions in the last decades in a context of finan-
cial deregulation (Krippner, 2004; Epstein, 2006; Palley, 2007). According 
to Epstein (2001, p. 1), financialization refers to “the increasing impor-
tance of financial markets, financial motives, financial institutions, and 
financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing insti-
tutions, both at the national and international levels”. Power et al. (2003) 
show that this phenomenon seems to have affected most OECD countries. 
The neo-liberal policies of the 1980s and the 1990s are generally presented 
as the main driver of this financialization (Palley, 2007; Krippner, 2011). 
The effects of this phenomenon on the real sector are discussed in more 
details in the next section.
The measures taken after the financial crisis have had a small impact 
on the financial sector: the situation today tends to be business as usual, 
the “usual” part being the pre-crisis situation. Leveraging is getting back 
to pre-crisis levels, and many investors are increasingly indebted. In the 
US, total corporate-bond debt is up 59% relative to 2007; corporate debts 
have doubled since 1999. Corporate leverage, that measures risk by compar-
ing debt to earnings, has returned to pre-crisis levels and more. However, 
households’ indebtedness has substantially reduced, and the situation of 
banks is much healthier than pre-crisis. Measures taken after the crisis 
have aimed at increasing the financial sector’s stability, by reducing the 
riskiness of the whole system via macro-prudential supervision.
The real economy needs the financial sector for its long-term investments. 
However, financial markets tend to generate excesses. Schumpeter was 
the view that economic cycles were efficient in regulating the economy: 
economic growth arises in boom phases, followed by recessions that are 
useful to eliminate unproductive projects. Minsky (1986) and Kindleberger 
(1978) argued in contrast that cycles are not efficient in that booms tend 
to favour speculative behaviours and excessive debt that ultimately lead to 
financial crises. Hence policy-makers goal in regulating financial markets 
should be to avoid excessive risk while ensuring contribution to growth. 
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Epstein and Crotty (2013) estimated that 60 to 70% of large investment 
banks, income in the height of the bubble derived from trading activities, 
related to speculation.
3. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE REAL SECTOR
The excessive growth of the financial sector has four consequences on the 
real sector. First, resources are drawn away from the real sector, leading 
to a lack of availability of financial resources for long-term investments. 
The structure and operation of the financial markets have changed due 
to financial innovation and deregulation, altering the menu of financial 
assets and liabilities as mentioned in the previous section. Post-Keynesian 
lines of inquiry have stressed the negative effects in particular of higher 
indebtedness, higher profit shares, shifts in income away from workers 
and lower retained profits of companies on long-run growth (Palley, 2007).
The effects of financialization on the capital accumulation process has 
been explored. Thus Crotty (2005) examined the increasing investments 
made by non-financial corporations in financial assets rather than pro-
ductive ones. Duménil and Lévy (2004) provided evidence of growing 
interest and dividend payments to financial markets, leading to smaller 
amounts of funds for real investment. Aglietta and Breton (2001) made the 
same point and argued that an active market for corporate control pushes 
firms to boost their share price through dividend payouts or stock buy-
backs and, as a consequence, the share of earnings devoted to financing 
growth is reduced.
Second, timing becomes too focused on the short-term versus the long-
term. Companies’ managers have increasingly been induced to put short-
term financial results as the priority. Cash flow, generated by productive 
and commercial activities are increasingly used for financial investments, 
namely investments in financial derivatives, re-purchase of own stocks 
and financing of mergers and acquisitions. The goal of shareholder value 
maximisation becomes the main objective of many corporations. This 
means that companies essentially work in the short-term at the expense 
of long-term investments. A number of management studies based on sur-
veys of firms’ managers have shown evidence of this shift in behaviour 
(see Salento et al., 2013, for a review).
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Short-termism is also stressed by Lazonick (2010), who shows that 438 com-
panies of the S&P500 listed in 1997 spent 2.7 trillion dollars in own stock 
repurchasing and distributed about 2 trillion dollars in dividends. Thus 
resources were shifted from the industrial sphere to the financial one. In 
addition, many non-financial firms have started to offer financial activ-
ities as well as industrial products, initially as a strategy to help sales of 
industrial products. Thus for instance automobile producers provide finan-
cial services to ease the purchase of cars for their customers. This could be 
seen as a useful practice to help sales, but the problem is that these finan-
cial activities have tended to become more profitable than the industrial 
ones for many firms, implying that in the end the production of goods 
becomes instrumental to the sale of financial services. For instance, the 
financial division General Motors Acceptance Corporation generated about 
80% of the earnings of the whole General Motors Group (Salento et al., 
2013). This contributes to the focus on shareholder value maximisation at 
the expense of long-term investments, namely short-termism of manage-
ment.
Third, not only financial resources but also intangible assets such as 
human resources are drawn away from the real to the financial sector. 
The evidence that the financial sector lures high-skilled people who could 
provide the technical and engineering skills needed in the financial sec-
tor illustrates this point.
Thus Philippon and Reshef (2007) show that the financial sector has been 
hiring more and more skilled individuals since the early-1980s, at a higher 
rate than the rest of the private sector. Wages have grown much faster in 
the financial sector than in the other sectors since the late-1970s onwards. 
The hour-share of college graduates increased from 13% to 30% in the pri-
vate sector between 1967 and 2005, and from 18% to 47.5% in the financial 
sector. In addition, the fastest growing occupations in the financial sector 
are related to trading of financial assets and to the use of computers and 
mathematics, at the expense of jobs involving more routine tasks.
Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) confirm this point by showing that finan-
cial sector growth indeed crowds out the real sector, drawing away highly-
skilled labour from R&D intensive sectors and sectors which depend on 
external finance for their investments. More specifically, they find that 
a R&D intensive sectors in countries with financial boom grow about 
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1.9 – 2.9% a year slower that low R&D intensive sector in countries with 
slow financial growth.
Fourth, the territorial dimension of activities shrinks. Financial activities 
are intangible and not linked to territories. When firms are essentially 
governed by short-term financial interests, the advantages of rooting their 
activities in territories and benefitting from social capital become second-
ary relative to short-term financial imperatives. More importantly, the 
financial sector gets increasing distance with important agents of indus-
trial development such as SMEs. The evidence is that SMEs have been par-
ticularly affected by the financial crisis in terms of access to finance and 
investment opportunities (EIB, 2013). The restructuring in the banking 
sector in the last decades has been characterised by mergers and acqui-
sitions leading to the creation of large banks and the reduction in small 
local banks, which have constituted the primary channel for SMEs rela-
tionships with the financial sector. Industrial development is a bottom-
up process, whereby firms are created in specific territories, where and 
when they find appropriate social and institutional networks. The eco-
nomic geography literature has stressed that point (see Boschma, 2015, for 
a review). In addition, current industrial structural changes seem to lead 
to an increasing importance of territories, which have to mobilise skills 
and knowledge in order to specialise in specific tasks and strategic phases 
of production processes in global value chains. For this purpose, regional 
industrial policy appears to have an important role (Bristow and Healy, 
2014; Bianchi and Labory, 2016a). This contrasts with the financial sector, 
which is global and not place-based.
4. NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AT THE TURN 
OF THE CENTURY
Europe is today experiencing an investment crisis. According to the EIB, 
in 2012, investment levels are about 17 per cent below their peak in 2008. 
Investment is particularly low in the most crisis-hit old Member States – 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Even before the crisis investment in 
non-financial activities was low, due to low expected returns compared to 
financial assets.
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Government investment in percentage of GDP was rather stable already 
before the crisis, although it increased in nominal terms (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Gross fixed capital formation by the government, 1995 to 2012
Source: EIB (2013, p. 144).
In 2007, immediately before the crisis, among the largest EU old mem-
bers, investment rates were higher than the EU average in Spain and Italy, 
below the EU average in France, the UK and Germany.
Figure 5. Ratio of gross fixed capital formation to gross value added 
in 2007
Source: EIB, 2013.
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Hence during the years of the revival of the debate on industrial policy, 
especially in Europe where the importance of this policy was increasingly 
stressed at both European and national levels, paradoxically investment 
was falling.
Yet industrial policy is primarily implemented by investments: in infra-
structure, in human capital and in innovation activities. Particularly at 
the turn of the century the importance of intangible assets was highly 
stressed, in the knowledge-based economy that was argued to be diffus-
ing (Bianchi and Labory, 2016b). Intangible assets are defined as claims to 
future benefits, which do not have a financial or physical embodiment, 
such as human capital, innovation, organisational and social capital. In 
the EU and the OECD in particular, intangible assets such as human capi-
tal and innovation have been at the centre of policy makers’ interests 
since the beginning of the years 2000, because they appear to be the key 
determinants of knowledge creation and entrepreneurship, hence of com-
petitiveness and growth (European Commission, 2000a, b; 2001a, b; OECD, 
2001a, b; 2003a, b).
Industrial policy strategies proposed at the turn of the new century there-
fore emphasise the importance of knowledge creation, hence innovation 
policy, as well as policies towards education and training, to raise the 
skills in the labour force. Labory (2006) also stressed that industrial poli-
cies implemented in the last 10 to 15 years in various countries, includ-
ing Europe, but also the USA and Japan, have stressed the importance of 
bottom-up processes, namely industrial development starting in specific 
poles or territories where particular knowledge and competencies concen-
trate. Hence the policy of cluster, especially high tech ones, is another 
aspect of the new industrial policy.
For instance a report of the European Cluster Observatory (Oxford 
Research, 2008) identified 69 national cluster policy programmes, 
together with regional programmes in 17 European countries. The OECD 
published different studies on clusters and their role in regional devel-
opment, particularly in innovation that clusters introduce in the eco-
nomic system (Roeland and den Hertog, 1999; OCSE, 2007). In their Global 
Cluster Initiative survey, Sölvell et al. (2003) surveyed 509 cluster initia-
tives realised worldwide; more than half of these were in Europe, and 
most concerned new or high tech sectors. Clusters are systems of firms, 
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especially SMEs, embedded in territories, standing in contrast with the 
global and place-less financial sector outlined in the last section.
Another point stressed has been the importance of the dialogue between 
the government, business and education and research institutions such as 
universities in the definition of appropriate industrial strategies. The gov-
ernance of industrial policy has to be multilevel and participative (Bianchi 
and Labory, 2016a). Participative means that industrial policy is designed 
taking account of the views of the different stakeholders involved in the 
industrial development process: business, worker representatives, edu-
cation institutions, and so on. This has been the case even at European 
level when business pushed in the late-1980s for the completion of the sin-
gle market as a policy to promote growth and jobs. However, industrial 
development is a bottom-process and firm creation primarily starts at the 
local level, when a small firm is created and develops thanks to a favour-
able environment. Even in globalisation and the diffusion of global value 
chains as production processes, territories have to specialise in specific 
tasks (Bianchi and Labory, 2011). Consequently the governance process of 
industrial policy has to be multilevel, with rules and specific programmes 
defined at national level but also complemented by regional industrial pol-
icy (Bianchi and Labory, 2016a).
These aspects have increasingly been stressed even in recent years, both 
at national and international levels: the OECD (Warwick, 2013) and many 
other organisations such as the Inter American Development Bank (IDB, 
2014) for instance have been advocating these aspects of industrial policy.
Industrial policies are now broadly defined, as policies aimed at favouring 
structural changes in productive sectors. They are no longer of the “pick-
ing the winner” or “national champion” type, in the sense of departing 
from the policies implemented in the first phase mentioned in this paper’s 
introduction, where governments directly intervened in markets to pro-
mote specific firms or industries and often be producers, via state-owner-
ship. Rather, they aim at providing the conditions for the competitiveness 
firms and industries, favouring specific growth path, particularly green 
growth paths (Rodrik, 2014).
Even in the UK the debate on industrial policy has been vivid (O’Sullivan 
et al., 2013; Bailey et al., 2015). The idea is that governments can have a role 
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in favouring comparative advantages of countries and “re-balancing” the 
economy when certain sectors are underdeveloped, particularly high tech 
and/or green ones.
Section 3 has highlighted the implications of the high growth of the 
financial sector on the real sector. It was argued that the financial sec-
tor was likely to draw away resources from the real sector, which could 
explain the investment crisis in Europe arising even prior to the crisis. 
Short-termism was a second consequence, contrasting with industrial pol-
icy, which has long-term horizon, aiming at favouring structural changes 
arising through long-term investments and long-term evolutionary pro-
cesses whereby new knowledge is created and diffuse in the economy, 
thanks to new human capital which skills take time to adjust, especially 
when highly-skilled workers are lured by the financial sector and not the 
real one (third consequence). 
Fourth, industrial development has been increasingly emphasised as a 
bottom-up process, whereby the territory and its capacity to create new 
firms and develop SMEs are key in spurring industrial development and 
growth. This is in contrast with the financialisation trends, which imply 
shrinking territorial dimension. Yet the importance of industrial policy at 
lower levels than the national one, especially the regional one, has been 
increasingly stressed, for instance in Italy (Cappellin et al., 2014).
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The European Commission has proposed with the 2020 Strategy a vision of 
industrial development leading to growth and jobs, based on environmen-
tal sustainability as well as social inclusion. An integrated industrial pol-
icy, comprising not only actions directly aimed at industry such as R&D 
subsidies, but also coherent social and educational policies (to favour access 
to the labour market thanks to the training in appropriate skills and social 
actions to help participation in the labour force, from health to child care, 
transport and housing), trade policy and competition policy. The discus-
sion above leads to propose a broad view of productive sectors that would 
include financial sectors, and policies towards the financial sectors that 
would provide incentive for financial institutions to focus their financing 
activities on the real sector rather than on speculative activities.
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For this purpose, Sawyer (2014) proposes four reforms of the financial sec-
tor that would support an industrial strategy. First, financial transaction 
taxes would help reduce speculation in the financial sector and therefore 
re-orientate finance towards long-term productive investments. Second, a 
separation between commercial and investment banking would help refo-
cus the financial sector on the savings-investment linkages. Third, a res-
tructuring of the banking sector should be promoted to discourage ban-
king activities in derivatives and other financial assets and to favour the 
channelling of savings to productive investments. Fourth, guided lending 
would ensure that specific shares of banks’ lending would flow to speci-
fic sectors, such as green sectors. This could also be favoured, according 
to Sawyer, by the creation of state sponsored development bank, such as a 
Green Investment Bank: “note that as with the European Investment Bank 
any lending by governments can be leveraged through direct borrowing 
by the development bank, and that such borrowing (as is the case with the 
European Investment Bank) does not appear on the balance sheets of any 
national or EU organisation” (Sawyer, 2014, p. 22).
Manufacturing renaissance has been advocated since the McKinsey 
Report of 2012, meaning that tertiarisation is not the panacea to all eco-
nomic problems, but industrial sectors are also important for economic 
development. The European Commission hence published a communica-
tion on industrial policy for manufacturing renaissance in 2014 (European 
Commission, 2014). However, the discussion in this paper shows that 
Manufacturing renaissance also means a rebalancing of productive sec-
tors, including a financial sector returning to its primary function of pro-
vider of finance to real and long-term activities.
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